TSB R23E0029: a 1991 railcar wheel, dirty steel and a shattered rim fatigue failure
TSB Canada found a 1991 freight wheel with oxides and voids up to 5.7 times the current limit grew subsurface fatigue cracks, shattered and derailed 18 cars.
Key takeaways
- A freight car wheel made in 1991 failed by shattered rim, a fatigue crack that grows from below the tread, and derailed 18 cars near Uncas, Alberta.
- Two of six rim samples exceeded the current AAR limit of 0.75% oxides plus voids, one by 5.7 times; hardness was within limits.
- The wheel passed visual inspections days before failure; ultrasonic testing is only done at manufacture or when a wheel is reprofiled.
- Wayside impact readings rose at successive detectors, but each reading was judged alone against a fixed threshold rather than as a trend.
- TSB Recommendation R26-02 asks Transport Canada and industry to develop trend-based analysis of wheel impact load detector data.
At a glance
- Investigating body
- Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB)
- Report
- R23E0029, released 24 September 2026
- Occurrence
- 5 April 2023, CN grain train, 18 cars derailed near Uncas, Alberta
- Failed part
- L4 wheel of car FURX 841817, manufactured 1991
- Failure mode
- Shattered rim: subsurface fatigue crack from inclusions and voids
- Worst cleanliness result
- 4.29% oxides plus voids against a 0.75% limit
- Injuries
- None reported
On 24 September 2026 the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) released report R23E0029. It covers the derailment of a Canadian National grain train near Uncas, Alberta, on 5 April 2023. Eighteen cars left the north main track and grain spilled from several of them. No injuries were reported.
The cause was a single wheel. The L4 wheel of car FURX 841817 had a shattered rim failure and lost part of its outboard rim and tread. It then hammered the rail on every revolution. Impact marks repeated about every 2.7 to 3.0 m (9 to 10 ft), matching the circumference of a 914 mm (36 in) wheel. The repeated blows broke the rail in several places until the train derailed.
What the investigation found
The TSB laboratory found beach marks on the fracture, confirming a fatigue crack that initiated and grew in service. Metallography showed manganese sulfide and oxide inclusions with scattered voids. The wheel was made in 1991, before the Association of American Railroads (AAR) introduced steel cleanliness standards for new wheels in 2003.
| Test | Result |
|---|---|
| Current AAR limit (worst field, oxides plus voids) | 0.75% |
| Sample 1 | 4.29% (5.7 times the limit) |
| Sample 3 | 2.74% (3.6 times the limit) |
| Other 4 samples | Within limits; sulfides within specification in all 6 |
| Hardness (Brinell and Rockwell C) | Within AAR limits |
The TSB notes the samples came from deeper than the standard location because of rim wear, so they give context rather than a formal acceptance test. Its finding is that the imperfections acted as stress raisers, subsurface cracks formed and grew to the tread, and the rim failed.
Detection failed at three levels. Visual inspections before the derailment found nothing. Ultrasonic testing can only be done at manufacture or when a wheel is removed for reprofiling. Current practice (RP-631) requires radial scans only, which can miss defects in some orientations. Wayside wheel impact load detectors (WILDs) did see the wheel getting worse, as its peak impacts rose at successive sites. On the day of the accident, a reading of about 496 kN (111.6 kip) triggered a replacement code. Under CN’s policy the wheel was due to be changed at Edmonton, about 31 km (19 miles) further on. It failed first.
The TSB says WILD data is judged one pass at a time against thresholds such as the 90 kip (about 400 kN) trigger in AAR Rule 41. Its exploratory analysis of this and three other broken-rim derailments showed trend-based, multi-metric screening could flag such wheels earlier. Recommendation R26-02 asks Transport Canada and industry to develop it.
Why it matters for design engineers
Material cleanliness is a fatigue design input, not only a procurement line. An inclusion is a notch you cannot see or dimension. Under rolling contact the highest shear stress sits below the surface, which is where these cracks started. Hardness was within limits, so a hardness check alone would not have flagged this wheel.
The monitoring lesson carries over to any fleet. A threshold tells you when a part is bad. A rate of change tells you when it is going bad fast. This wheel was flagged and scheduled, and it still failed on the way to the shop.
Sources
- TSB, Rail transportation safety investigation report R23E0029 (released 24 September 2026)
- TSB news release, TSB calls for enhanced analytics of railcar wheels (24 September 2026)
Standards: AAR Specification M-107/M-208; AAR Interchange Rule 41
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